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Abstract
A product exhibits personal ￿t uncertainty when its consumers have idiosyn-
cratic and uncertain values for it. Often a consumer can learn her long-run value
quickly by obtaining the good for a trial period. Money back guarantees of satis-
faction are commonly used to lower the cost to consumers of learning their values
this way. Increasingly, however, consumers can instead learn about their values
before they purchase by, e.g., reading product reviews or consulting experts. We
study the e⁄ect on a ￿rm￿ s optimal price and refund of this competing source of
information. An e¢ cient outcome would be achieved by setting the refund for a
return equal to its salvage value. But a monopoly will, for some parameters, induce
consumers to stay uninformed by promising a refund that is greater than the sal-
vage value. This generates an ine¢ ciently large number of returns, which the ￿rm
￿nds worthwhile in order to eliminate the information rents that consumers would
obtain by becoming informed. This ￿nding is consistent with the observation that
for many products, money back guarantees are generous, as they commonly refund
the entire, or almost the entire, purchase price of a product.
Keywords: information acquisition, refunds, money back guarantees, personal ￿t
uncertainty
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A product market exhibits ￿personal ￿t uncertainty￿if the consumers of the product
have idiosyncratic and uncertain values for it. For example, a purchaser of a lamp
may be unsure it will match the home decor; a purchaser of a present for a friend may
be unsure of the friend￿ s tastes; a purchaser of clothing from a catalog or online store
may be unsure of its true cut or color; a purchaser of a textbook may be unsure about
whether she will drop the course; a purchaser of a camera may be unsure if its controls
will suit her hands. In each case the customer is uncertain of her value for the good, and
di⁄erent ones are likely to have di⁄erent values. In each case it is not the common-value
quality of the product, privately known to the seller or otherwise, that is uncertain, but
rather the ￿t of the product to the speci￿c customer who purchased it.
A consumer can often evaluate the ￿t of a product quickly once it is in her possession,
without fully consuming it. This learning opportunity is socially bene￿cial if the product
is returned to the seller when the consumer￿ s subsequent value for it is less than that
of the seller. It may also be a source of additional pro￿t, since the seller can increase
demand for trial usage by o⁄ering a money back guarantee of satisfaction. We interpret
such a guarantee broadly as a promise to refund a speci￿ed amount of the purchase
price if the product is returned within a certain period of time. The refund is paid
with ￿no questions asked,￿ since subjective satisfaction is unveri￿able. Money back
guarantees are ubiquitous in consumer markets, especially in the United States. Indeed,
the return option they create is often used: approximately six percent of all retail goods
are returned in the United States,1 and far more in internet and catalog retailing.2
Our point of departure is the observation that consumers increasingly have ways of
learning about their values for products before they purchase them. For example, in
order to better estimate personal ￿t, a consumer can read descriptions and reviews on
the internet and in magazines. She can consult experts and friends who purchased the
good in the past, and she can devote time to studying her own needs. Our purpose in
this paper is to identify the e⁄ects of such ex ante research options on a seller￿ s choice
of refund and purchase price.
An inital question, however, is whether it is more e¢ cient for a consumer to learn
1Rogers and Tibben-Lembke (1999), p. 7-9.
2A NFO Interactive survey shows that in 2000, twenty percent of internet shoppers who purchased a
product online in the ￿rst six months of the year returned it within six months. According to Forrester
Research, the value of internet returns after the 2000 Christmas season was nearly 600 million dollars.
According to Hammond and Kohler (2002), 12-35% of clothing purchased from catalogs is returned.
1ex ante about her ￿t to a good, or to instead use the good on a trial basis. The
answer depends on the relative costs and accuracies of the two information channels.
A consumer￿ s cost of ex ante research is likely to be greater than her cost of trying the
good ￿the latter cost could even be negative if the good yields a bene￿t during the trial
period. On the other hand, the cost of producing the good is saved if the consumer
forgoes purchasing when she learns ex ante that she has a low value for it.
A pro￿t-maximizing seller has an additional reason to want the consumers to stay
uninformed. For, if they privately learn their values ex ante, the consumers who decide
to purchase will receive an information rent that cuts into the seller￿ s share of the
surplus. Consequently, if the seller could simply choose whether its customers are ex
ante informed of their values, it would sometimes choose to have them uninformed when
e¢ ciency would prescribe that they become informed.
The seller can induce the consumes to stay uninformed by promising a generous
refund for returns. However, a refund is an imperfect instrument for this purpose, for
two reasons. First, refunds that are too large decrease the total surplus by generating too
many returns. Second, in order to keep consumers from wanting to become informed,
they may have to be charged a low purchase price and hence be given a sizable share
of the surplus anyway. These forces lower the seller￿ s incentive to keep consumers
uninformed. They may even cause the seller to prefer to induce its customers to become
informed, by not o⁄ering a guarantee, despite the resultant loss of information rent.
We study a simple model that delineates these forces and their e⁄ects. A ￿rm
produces a discrete product for a mass of risk neutral consumers with unit demands.
Each consumer￿ s value for the good is initially unknown, but she can learn it either
before purchasing at some cost, or during a trial period after purchasing. For various
parameter con￿gurations, we determine the ￿rm￿ s optimal price and refund, whether
the consumers become informed, and the nature of the resulting ine¢ ciency.
The ￿rm￿ s optimal scheme depends upon the information cost to the consumers of
becoming ex ante informed of their values. When the information cost is relatively low,
the ￿rm o⁄ers no refund and the consumers become informed. However, the seller may
still need to charge a price lower than the usual monopoly price for informed consumers.
The latter price can be so high that if it were to be charged, the consumers would prefer
not to purchase. The ￿rm then charges a lower price that just makes the consumers
willing to become informed.
When the information cost is in an intermediate range, the ￿rm induces the con-
sumers to stay uninformed. It does this by o⁄ering a refund that is larger than the
2salvage value of a return. The excessive refund generates an ine¢ ciently large number
of returns. This result is in accordance with the generous refunds and large numbers of
returns seen in some markets.
At the end we brie￿ y consider two kinds of extension. The ￿rst allows consumers to
receive a bene￿t from using the product during the trial period, as when a television set
is purchased the day before the Super Bowl game. Including this bene￿t does not a⁄ect
the magnitude of optimal refunds, but it does expand the set of situations in which
refunds are o⁄ered. The second kind of extension is to a more competitive environment.
1.1. Related Literature
A small literature studies monopoly selling schemes for goods with personal ￿t uncer-
tainty resolved by post-purchase consumer learning. In such a setting, Davis et al.(1995,
1998) consider the use of full money-back refunds to increase demand, and of ￿hassle￿
costs to limit the number of returns. Che (1996) shows that a monopoly may o⁄er a full
refund as a way of providing insurance to risk averse consumers. Fruchter and Gerstner
(1999) show that ￿satisfaction-guaranteed￿ refunds, which are equal to the purchase
price plus the hassle costs of making a return, are sometimes more pro￿table than full
money back refunds or zero refunds. Chu et al.(1998) show that optimal refunds may
be partial if consumers bene￿t from the product during the trial period.3
The details of our model di⁄er from those of these papers, and we address some
di⁄erent issues (e.g., e¢ ciency). The main di⁄erence, however, is our introduction of ex
ante research by consumers, which provides an entirely di⁄erent rationale for refunds.
The only paper we know that considers a second way for consumers to learn their
values is Heiman et al.(2001), a marketing paper which compares the pro￿tability of
pre-purchase product demonstrations to those of money back guarantees.
Our model can be viewed broadly as a contribution to the literature on mecha-
nisms that prevent, encourage, or determine information acquisition, such as Cremer
and Khalil (1992), Lewis and Sappington (1997), Cremer et al.(1998a,b), and Berge-
mann and V￿lim￿ki (2002). It also relates to studies of how much information a seller
should directly provide buyers about their personal values, such as Lewis and Sapping-
ton (1994), Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2002), and Eso and Szentes (2004).
3Further a￿eld is Courty and Li (2000), in which a menu of refund contracts is used to screen
imperfectly privately informed consumers who subsequently learn their values for the good. In this
paper consumers are ex ante identical, and screening is not possible. Our working paper, ￿Information
Acquisition and the Excess Refund Puzzle,￿contains a related screening model.
3More narrowly, the model can be viewed as developing a suggestion by Barzel (1982)
that sellers may sometimes want to prevent buyers from acquiring information. This
suggestion is also pursued in Barzel et al.(2004) in a model of IPO policies. An under-
writer ￿stabilizes￿an IPO by promising to agree to buy back a certain fraction of the
shares from the buying investors at the IPO price. This is analogous to a stochastic
contract in our framework that randomizes between a zero and a full refund. Barzel et
al.(2004) show that if the underwriter wants to deter buyers from acquiring information,
its optimal stabilization policy pays the full refund with positive probability.
Lastly, we warn the reader of two literatures that may appear more related than
they are. The ￿rst is about how aggregate uncertainty in consumer demand can cause
a manufacturer to o⁄er a refund to retailers for ordered but unsold inventory, as in
Marvel and Peck (1995), Kandel (1996), and Padmanabhan and Png (1997). Although
we brie￿ y interpret our model (in Section 7) as one in which a manufacturer wholesaler
sells to a competitive retail sector, it has no aggregate uncertainty.
The other seemingly related literature is on warranties, which focuses on product
quality rather than personal ￿t uncertainty. This literature generally considers sit-
uations in which evidence of low quality, such as product breakdown, is veri￿able.
Although the distinction is not sharp and not always followed, warranties have been
distinguished from guarantees in so far as they specify replacement, repair, or refunds
for products that veri￿able non-performance, not refunds for subjective dissatisfaction
(e.g., Davis et al., 1995, 1998). The vast literature on warranties has viewed them as
devices that, e.g., provide insurance against product failure (Heal, 1977); signal a seller￿ s
private information about product quality (Grossman, 1981; Lutz, 1989; Moorthy and
Srinivasan, 1995; Shieh, 1996); screen heterogenous consumers (Matthews and Moore,
1986; Mann and Wissank, 1989); and deal with moral hazard (Cooper and Ross, 1985).
In contrast, we focus on markets in which dissatisfaction is subjective, consumers are risk
neutral, sellers have no informational advantage, and consumers are not heterogenous
in a way that allows a screening menu to be used.
1.2. Structure of the Paper
The environment is described in Section 2, and the e¢ cient benchmark in Section 3.
The ￿rm￿ s optimal choice of price and refund are derived in Sections 4 and 5. Welfare
and comparative statics are discussed in Section 6. Extensions to allow for trial-period
bene￿ts and for competition are considered in Section 7. 8 concludes. Appendix A
contains some proofs, and Appendix B an example.
42. Environment
The set of agents is a unit mass (continuum) of potential buyers, and a ￿rm that sells
them a discrete good. For now, we have in mind a retailer and its customers.
2.1. Consumers
Each consumer wants at most one unit of the good. Her use value for it, v; is drawn
from a distribution F that has a positive and di⁄erentiable density, f; on [0;1]; with
mean ￿ v: An informed consumer knows her value for the good when she decides whether
to purchase it, and an uninformed consumer does not. No consumer￿ s value is observed
by another party.
An uninformed consumer who purchases the good learns her value for it during an
initial trial period. For now, a consumer is assumed to receive no bene￿t from the good
during the trial period. She bears a return cost of t ￿ 0 if she tries the good and then
returns it to the seller.
A consumer with value v who purchases the good for price p receives utility v ￿p if
she keeps it, gross of any cost she might have borne to become informed. If she instead
returns the good for a refund ^ r; her utility is ^ r ￿ t ￿ p:
All consumers are ex ante identical and uninformed. Once a consumer knows the set
of contracts available in the market, she chooses whether to pay an information cost,
c ￿ 0; in order to become informed (￿acquire information￿ ).
2.2. Firm
The ￿rm has a constant unit cost of procuring the good, k > 0: It is either the cost of
directly producing the good, or of obtaining it from a wholesaler.
The ￿rm has a gross salvage value, ^ s; for a returned good. It is the maximum
amount the ￿rm is willing to pay for a return, and so it cannot exceed the ￿rm￿ s cost of
producing a new unit. In general ^ s should be less than k : if a return is resold, ^ s is equal
to the cost k that is saved when a returned rather than a new unit is used to make a
sale, less the necessary refurbishing, restocking, and storing costs. We assume ^ s ￿ k:
We also assume t < ^ s; so that the gross salvage value of a return exceeds a consumer￿ s
cost of making a return after trying the good out.
Most of the results depend on the (net) salvage value of a return, s ￿ ^ s￿t: In terms
of it, the parameter assumptions 0 ￿ t < ^ s ￿ k become the following:
Assumption 1. k ￿ s ￿ t ￿ 0 and s > 0:
52.3. Contracts
The gross refund paid by the ￿rm for a return is ^ r. The (net) refund the consumer
receives is the gross bene￿t less the cost of trying and returning, r ￿ ^ r ￿ t: We assume
the gross refund cannot be negative, which is equivalent to r ￿ ￿t: A refund contract
is a pair (p;r) consisting of the purchase price p and the net refund r:
We assume the ￿rm will lose money if it o⁄ers a gross refund greater than the
purchase price. Unlike the cost t of returning the good after trying it, a consumer￿ s cost
of returning the good immediately after purchasing it is presumably negligible. Hence,
o⁄ering a gross refund greater than the price would create a money pump in which
consumers purchase and return large numbers of the good, creating a loss for the ￿rm.
Such consumer arbitrage is prevented if and only if ^ r ￿ p:4 Combining this no-arbitrage
constraint with nonnegativity yields a feasibility constraint on the net refund:
(FE) 0 ￿ r + t ￿ p:
Three speci￿c kinds of contracts are worth naming.
(a) A no-refund contract is any (p;r) with r ￿ 0: It generates no returns, and is
equivalent to selling the good without a guarantee, i.e., to the contract (p;￿t)
that has a gross refund ^ r = r + t = 0:
(b) A full-refund contract is one in which the gross refund is equal to the purchase
price. It takes the form, (p;r) = (p;p￿t); so that ^ r = p: A full-refund contract is
optimal when the no-arbitrage part of (FE) binds.
(c) A (full) satisfaction-guaranteed contract has the form (p;p); so that the gross refund
is ^ r = p + t: Such a contract entirely eliminates the downside risk of a purchase,
and satis￿es (FE) if and only if t = 0:
2.4. Payo⁄s
An uninformed consumer returns the good if and only if she learns during the trial
period that her value for it is less than the net refund o⁄ered for a return. The most





4In Subsection 6.2 below we consider a weaker no-arbitrage condition.
6Integrating by parts yields




The ￿rst term in (1) is the consumer￿ s expected (use) value for the good, and the second
is her value for the return option generated by the guarantee. Her marginal value for
an increase in the refund is V 0
u(r) = F(r); the probability that she returns the good.
When o⁄ered a contract (p;r); an uninformed consumer purchases only if p ￿ Vu(r):
The ￿rm￿ s expected pro￿t is then
￿u(p;r) ￿ p ￿ k ￿ (r ￿ s)F(r): (2)
An informed consumer, on the other hand, does not care about the refund guarantee.
She purchases the good only if she knows she will keep it, and only if her value exceeds
the price. Given that she pays c to become informed, her ex ante expected utility is




(v ￿ p)dF(v): (3)
Integrating this by parts and comparing to (1) establishes that
Vi(p) = Vu(p) ￿ p: (4)
Becoming informed when the price is p is payo⁄ equivalent to staying uninformed when
o⁄ered the satisfaction-guaranteed contract (p;p):
O⁄ering the good for price p to an informed consumer yields expected pro￿t
￿i(p) ￿ (p ￿ k)(1 ￿ F(p)): (5)
We assume the following for convenience.
Assumption 2. ￿i(￿) has a unique maximizer, pI; and ￿0
i (p) ? 0 as p 7 pI:
3. E¢ cient Contracts and Outcomes
In order to establish the e¢ cient benchmark, we start at the two possible interim stages
following an information acquisition decision, and then turn to that decision itself.
73.1. Informed Consumers
Suppose the consumers have become informed. Then e¢ ciency requires the good to
be delivered to precisely those whose values exceed the production cost, i.e., to each
consumer with value v ￿ k: This outcome is achieved by o⁄ering any contract that
speci￿es p = k: Given that the consumers have become informed, the amount of the
promised refund is irrelevant because they do not return the good.
The maximal expected surplus that can be generated when the consumers have





(v ￿ k)dF(v) ￿ c = Vi(k) ￿ c: (6)
3.2. Uninformed Consumers
Suppose now that the consumers have stayed uninformed. A consumer who then obtains
the good and learns her value is v generates a surplus of s or v; depending on whether
she returns the good. E¢ ciency requires it to be returned if s > v. The resulting
surplus is max(v;s) ￿ k: The maximal expected surplus generated by giving the good
to an uninformed consumer is hence
S￿
u ￿ Vu(s) ￿ k: (7)
We take this to be positive, so that it is e¢ cient to produce for the uninformed.
Assumption 3. k < Vu(s):
The e¢ cient outcome conditional on the consumers being uninformed is achieved by
o⁄ering a contract that speci￿es the refund r = s; so that precisely those consumers with
values less than s will return the good, and a price p ￿ Vu(s); so that they purchase the
good. Among the e¢ cient contracts for an uninformed consumer that yield nonnegative
payo⁄s, (k;s) is the best for the consumers, giving the ￿rm zero pro￿t, and (Vu(s);s) is
the best for the ￿rm, giving it a pro￿t equal to the entire surplus S￿
u:
3.3. E¢ cient Information Acquisition
It is e¢ cient for the consumers to become informed if S￿
i (c) exceeds S￿
u: Equating the
two and solving for c yields the social value of ex ante information:





8The consumer should become informed if c < c￿; and stay uninformed if c > c￿:
The formula for the value of information c￿ can be derived in a more intuitive way.
Learning a consumer￿ s value for the good ex ante allows the mistake of producing the
good for her when her value is less than the production cost to be avoided. When her
value is v; the net cost of this mistake is k ￿ max(v;s). The most that should be paid
for the information is the expected cost of this mistake,
k R
0




3.4. Achieving E¢ ciency
We have seen that the contract (k;s) achieves an e¢ cient outcome conditional on either
information acquisition decision. It also gives the consumers the entire surplus that
can be generated by that decision: S￿
i (c) if they become informed, and S￿
u if they stay
uninformed. They therefore acquire information e¢ ciently when o⁄ered (k;s), and the
resulting outcome is fully e¢ cient.
Other contracts also achieve e¢ ciency. If c ￿ c￿, any contract with p = k and r ￿ s
does so, since lowering the refund from s will only strengthen the consumers incentive
to become informed. If c > c￿; e¢ ciency is achieved by any contract with r = s and a
price low enough that the consumers will stay uninformed and purchase.
E¢ ciency would be achieved if there were multiple ￿rms competing in Bertrand
fashion. Speci￿cally, suppose the ￿rms simultaneously and publicly o⁄er contracts, and
then each consumer decides whether to become informed, and then whether to purchase
and from which ￿rm. The subgame perfect equilibria of this game are e¢ cient and give
the ￿rms zero pro￿t, by the usual undercutting argument. Hence, (k;s) is the unique
equilibrium contract if c > c￿: It is also an equilibrium contract if c ￿ c￿; although
then the return option is unused because the consumers become informed. A no-refund
contract with price p = k is also an equilibrium contract in this case.
4. Constrained Pro￿t Maximizing
We now consider two constrained pro￿t-maximizing programs for the monopoly ￿rm.
One restricts the set of allowed contracts to those that induce consumers to stay unin-
formed, and the other to contracts that induce them to become informed. The ￿rm￿ s
optimal policy is later determined by comparing the values of the two programs.
94.1. Inducing Consumers to Stay Uninformed
A consumer who is o⁄ered a contract (p;r) and has stayed uninformed is willing to
purchase if and only if the contract satis￿es an individual rationality constraint:
(IRu) Vu(r) ￿ p ￿ 0:





In words, (9) requires the consumer￿ s cost of becoming informed to exceed the maximum
amount she would be willing to pay to become informed. It is convenient to rewrite (9)
as a bound on the price,
(IAu) p ￿ P(r;c);
where P(r;c) is de￿ned for any (r;c) by the following expression:5
P(r;c) R
r
F(v)dv ￿ c: (10)
Inequality (IAu) is the information acquisition constraint for inducing consumers to stay
uninformed. Since P is an increasing function, this constraint loosens if r or c increases,
so that a larger price can be charged without triggering information acquisition.
The maximal pro￿t that can be achieved by inducing consumers to stay uninformed
is the value of the following program:
(Pu) ￿u(c) ￿ max
p;r p ￿ k ￿ (r ￿ s)F(r)
subject to (IRu); (IAu); and (FE).
Note that at least one of the two upper bound constraints on the price, (IRu) and (IAu);
must bind. That is, (p￿;r￿) is a solution only if p￿ is the smaller of Vu(r￿) and P(r￿;c):
Proposition 1 (i) below characterizes the solution of (Pu) when the information
acquisition constraint can be ignored. Observe that if (IAu) is deleted, the solution
is (p;r) = (Vu(s);s); since this contract achieves, and gives to the ￿rm, the maximal
surplus S￿
u = Vu(s) ￿ k that can be obtained when the consumers stay uninformed. It





5Let P(r;0) = 0 for r < 0: Then P is well-de￿ned and continuous on R ￿ R+:
10This proves that (Vu(s);s) is the solution when c ￿ ￿ c:
Proposition 1 (ii); proved in Appendix A, concerns the case c < ￿ c: It states that
if c is still high enough that the ￿rm can make pro￿t by inducing consumers to stay
uninformed, then (IAu) binds, and the optimal refund exceeds the salvage value.
Proposition 1.
(i) If c ￿ ￿ c; then (Vu(s);s) is the unique solution of (Pu): That is, if the consumers￿
cost of becoming informed is equal to or greater than the threshold ￿ c; then the
maximal pro￿t that can be achieved by inducing consumers to stay uninformed is
uniquely achieved by the contract (Vu(s);s):
(ii) If c < ￿ c and ￿u(c) > 0; then any solution (p￿;r￿) of (Pu) satis￿es p￿ = P(r￿;c)
and r￿ > s: That is, if the consumers￿cost of becoming informed is below the
threshold ￿ c; and the maximal pro￿t that can be achieved by inducing consumers
to stay uninformed is positive, then any contract that achieves that pro￿t and
induces the consumers to stay uninformed makes the consumers indi⁄erent about
becoming informed, and speci￿es a refund greater than the salvage value.
We give here a heuristic argument for why r￿ > s in part (ii): Suppose the ￿rm
must, in order to deter information acquisition, charge the price P(r;c) when it wants
to promise a refund r: Increasing the refund then generates a marginal bene￿t equal to
the amount that the increase in the refund allows the price to be raised:




The ￿ L￿denotes ￿low￿ , as this is the low cost case of Proposition 1 (ii): On the other
hand, when c is high as in Proposition 1 (i); the ￿rm can charge the maximal price
Vu(r) without triggering information acquisition. It￿ s marginal bene￿t from raising the
refund is the amount this price can then be raised:
MBH ￿ V 0
u(r) = F(r):
Observe that for any r > 0; MBL > MBH : needing to actively deter information
acquisition increases the ￿rm￿ s marginal bene￿t from raising the refund. The marginal
cost of raising the refund is the same in the two cases, MC ￿ @(r ￿ s)F(r)=@r; and so
MBL ￿ MC > MBH ￿ MC for all r > 0: The optimal refund is s in the high c case,
and so satis￿es MBH ￿ MC = 0 (since s > 0): Therefore, MBL ￿ MC > 0 at r = s:
This shows that in the low c case, raising the refund above s increases pro￿t.
114.2. Inducing Consumers to Become Informed
Turning to the problem of maximizing pro￿t while inducing consumers to become in-
formed, the ￿rst constraint is that they should prefer becoming informed to not pur-
chasing: Vi(p) ￿ c ￿ 0: Letting Pi ￿ V ￿1
i ; this constraint is
(IRi) p ￿ Pi(c):
The second constraint insures that consumers prefer to become informed rather
than to stay uninformed and purchase. A no-refund contract maximizes a consumer￿ s
incentive to become informed. Thus, since a refund is also not paid when consumers
become informed, we can restrict attention to no-refund contracts. By the arguments
in the previous subsection, when they are o⁄ered a no-refund contract with a price
p; the consumers are willing to become informed, rather than to stay uninformed and
purchase, only if the following information acquisition constraint holds:
(IAi) p ￿ P(0;c):
The consumers are willing to become informed if and only if both (IRi) and (IAu)
are satis￿ed. The maximal pro￿t that can then be obtained is thus
(Pi) ￿i(c) ￿ max
p ￿i(p)
subject to P(0;c) ￿ p ￿ Pi(c):
The constraint set of this program is the area between the two curves in Figure 1, and
to the left of c = Vi(￿ v). To verify the ￿gure, note that P(0;0) = 0 and Pi(0) = 1; P(0;c)
increases and Pi(c) decreases in c; and P(0;c) = Pi(c) = ￿ v at c = Vi(￿ v):6 The constraint
set is nonempty if and only if c ￿ Vi(￿ v) : the consumers cannot be induced to become
informed if doing so costs them more than Vi(￿ v):7
The solution is pI; the unconstrained maximizer of ￿i; when c is small enough that
P(0;c) ￿ pI ￿ Pi(c): One of the two constraints binds when c is higher. If pI > ￿ v; the
constraint that can bind is (IRi); and it does so when c > Vi(pI): In this case pI is so
high that if it were to be charged, the consumers would prefer not to purchase than to
become informed, but lowering the price would induce them to become informed. The
￿single-peaked￿property of ￿i required by Assumption 2 implies that when pI > Pi(c);
the solution of (Pi) is Pi(c); the price in the constraint set that is closest to pI:
6These claims are obvious except perhaps for P(0;Vi(￿ v)) = ￿ v: This identity comes from the de￿nition
(10), together with the expression Vi(￿ v) =
R ￿ v
0 F(v)dv implied by (1) and (4).
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p*(c) if pI > v
p*(c) if pI < v
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P(0,c)
Figure 1: The two possible forms of a solution to (Pi):
A similar argument shows that if pI < ￿ v; then only (IAi) can bind. We therefore
have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Consumers can be induced to acquire information only if c; their cost
of becoming informed, satis￿es 0 ￿ c ￿ Vi(￿ v): In this case the maximal pro￿t that can
be obtained while inducing consumers to become informed is uniquely achieved by a
no-refund contract with price
p￿(c) ￿
(
min(pI;Pi(c)) if pI ￿ ￿ v
max(pI;P(0;c)) if pI ￿ ￿ v:
5. The Optimal Contract
We now characterize the ￿rm￿ s optimal contract. We do so by determining which of the
constrained pro￿t functions, ￿u(c) or ￿i(c); is greater for each value of c:
We ￿rst dispense with the case of high information costs. Recall that if c > c￿;
maximal surplus is largest when consumers stay uninformed: S￿
u > S￿
i (c): Proposition
1 (i) implies that ￿u(c) = S￿
u for c ￿ ￿ c: Therefore, since individual rationality implies
S￿
i (c) is an upper bound on the pro￿t that can be obtained by inducing consumers to
become informed, ￿u(c) > ￿i(c) if c > c￿ and c ￿ ￿ c. We have ￿ c > c￿; by Assumption 3.
This proves the following lemma.
13Lemma 1. ￿u(c) > ￿i(c) for all c ￿ ￿ c:
Thus, for high costs c ￿ ￿ c; the ￿rm prefers to induce consumers to stay uninformed.
By continuity this should be true for somewhat lower costs as well. But if c is quite low,
the consumers will want to become informed unless the o⁄ered price is quite low and/or
the refund quite high. This will make the constrained pro￿t ￿u(c) small. We should
thus expect that if c is su¢ ciently low, the ￿rm will prefer to induce the consumers to
become informed. This is true, so long as s < k: But if s = k; there is no net cost of
producing a good for a consumer who will return it ￿the social cost of learning one￿ s
value by trying the good is zero, and hence less than the cost of becoming ex ante
informed for any c > 0: This causes the ￿rm to always prefer, when s = k; to induce
the consumers to stay uninformed. The following lemma con￿rms these intuitions.
Lemma 2. c 2 [0;￿ c) exists such that for all c ￿ 0;
￿u(c) S ￿i(c) as c S c:
Furthermore, c = 0 if and only if s = k:
Proof. We apply the intermediate value theorem to ￿(c) ￿ ￿u(c) ￿ ￿i(c): We know
￿(￿ c) > 0; by Lemma 1. Hence, we need to prove that (i) ￿ is continuous on [0;￿ c]; (ii)
￿ is strictly increasing on [0;￿ c]; and (iii) ￿(0) < 0 (￿(0) = 0) when s < k (s = k):
(i) The maximum theorem implies ￿u is continuous on R+: Proposition 2 implies
￿i is continuous at any c ￿ Vi(￿ v): So ￿ is continuous on [0;￿ c] if ￿ c ￿ Vi(￿ v): When c = ￿ c,
the contract (Vu(s);s) satis￿es (IAi) and (IRi) with equality, and (FE). The constraint
set of (Pi) is therefore nonempty when c = ￿ c. This proves ￿ c ￿ Vi(￿ v):
(ii) Let 0 ￿ c1 < c2 < ￿ c; and let (pi;ri) solve (Pu) when c = ci: Since P(r;c1) <
P(r;c2) for all r; (p1;r1) is in the constraint set when c = c2: This implies ￿u(c1) ￿
￿u(c2): If this were an equality, (p1;r1) would be a solution for c2 as well as c1; in which
case Proposition 1 (ii) would imply p1 = P(r1;ci) for both i = 1;2: This contradiction
of P(￿;c1) < P(￿;c2) proves that ￿u(￿) strictly increases on [0;￿ c]:
(iii) By Proposition 2, ￿i(0) = ￿i(pI) > 0: We have three cases to consider: s = k;
which implies t = 0; s < k and t = 0; and s < k and t > 0: The last case is easiest:
if t > 0; the only contract in the constraint set of (Pu) when c = 0 is the zero-price
no-refund contract (0;￿t): It yields pro￿t ￿k ￿ 0; proving that ￿(0) < 0 in this case.
Turning now to the ￿rst two cases, suppose t = 0: Then the constraint set of (Pu) when
c = 0 consists of all satisfaction-guaranteed contracts with p ￿ 0: From (2) and (5), we
14obtain the identity ￿u(p;p) = ￿i(p) ￿ (k ￿ s)F(p): Thus,
￿u(0) = max
p￿0
f￿i(p) ￿ (k ￿ s)F(p)g: (12)
Hence, if s = k; then ￿u(0) = ￿i(pI) = ￿i(0): In the remaining case, s < k and t = 0;
the objective function in (12) is strictly less than ￿i(p) for all p > 0: This implies, since
pI, the unique maximizer ￿i; is positive, that ￿u(0) < ￿i(pI) = ￿i(0):
We now put these two lemmas together with Propositions 1 and 2. For the case of
high information costs, Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 (i) yield the following.
Theorem 1. If the consumer￿ s cost of becoming informed satis￿es c ￿ ￿ c; then the
￿rm￿ s unique optimal policy is to induce the consumers to stay uninformed by o⁄ering
the contract (Vu(s);s):
For the case c < ￿ c; we use Proposition 1 (ii) to characterize the optimal contract
when ￿u(c) ￿ ￿i(c): But that proposition only applies when ￿u(c) > 0: The following
lemma shows that the ￿rm can always make positive pro￿t, and so ￿u(c) > 0 is indeed
true whenever ￿u(c) ￿ ￿i(c):
Lemma 3. For any c ￿ 0; max(￿u(c);￿i(c)) > 0:
Proof. Suppose the ￿rm o⁄ers a contract (p;s); with k < p < Vu(s). If the consumers￿
best reply is to stay uninformed, they purchase because p < Vu(s); and the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t
is p ￿ k > 0: The only alternative consumer best reply is to become informed, in which
case pro￿t is (p￿k)(1￿F(p)) > 0: This contract is thus feasible for at least one of the
programs (Pu) or (Pi); and generates positive pro￿t for it.
Most of the following theorem now follows from Lemma 2 and Propositions 1 (ii) and
2. The exception is the statement that when c < c; the price speci￿ed by the optimal
no-refund contract is the smaller of pI and Pi(c): This seems to contradict Proposition
2 when pI ￿ ￿ v; as then the price should be max(pI;P(0;c)): The proof resolves the
contradiction by showing that if the price P(0;c) were to solve (Pi); then it would be
more pro￿table to induce the consumers to stay uninformed, contrary to c < c:
Theorem 2. Suppose the consumer￿ s cost of becoming informed satis￿es c < ￿ c; and let
let c 2 [0;￿ c) be the threshold cost given in Lemma 2. Then:
(i) If c > c; the ￿rm￿ s unique optimal policy is to induce consumers to stay uninformed,
and an optimal contract (p￿;r￿) satis￿es p￿ = P(r￿;c) and r￿ > s:
15(ii) If c < c; the ￿rm￿ s unique optimal policy is to induce consumers to become in-
formed, and it does so by o⁄ering a no-refund contract with price p￿ = min(pI;Pi(c)):
Proof. It remains only to show that if c < c and p is the optimal price, then p =
min(pI;Pi(c)): Since p solves (Pi); this is true by Proposition 2 if pI ￿ ￿ v: So suppose
pI < ￿ v: Then p = max(pI;P(0;c)): Assume p = P(0;c): By de￿nition, the no-refund
contract with price P(0;c) makes the consumers indi⁄erent between becoming informed,
and staying uninformed and purchasing. So the constraint set of (Pu) contains (p;0):
This implies p ￿ k ￿ ￿u(c): But then ￿i(c) = (p ￿ k)(1 ￿ F(p)) ￿ ￿u(c); which
contradicts Lemma 2. This proves p = pI: Hence, because pI < ￿ v and ￿ v < Pi(c); we
have p = min(pI;Pi(c)):
6. Welfare and Comparative Statics
In this section we draw out some of the welfare and comparative static implications of
Theorems 1 and 2. We discuss separately the cases of information costs that are high,
medium, and low: c > ￿ c; c 2 (c;￿ c); and c 2 (0;c); respectively.
6.1. High Information Costs
When c > ￿ c; the ￿rm achieves an e¢ cient outcome by o⁄ering the contract (Vu(s);s):
Consumers stay uninformed and purchase, which is optimal since ￿ c > c￿: The e¢ cient
number of returns are obtained because the refund is equal to the salvage value of
a return. The purchase price increases in the net salvage value, s = ^ s ￿ t; and is
independent of the other parameters except F:
6.2. Medium Information Costs
When c 2 (c;￿ c); the ￿rm induces the consumers to stay uninformed, and it does so
by promising a refund that exceeds the salvage value of a return. This generates an
ine¢ ciently large number of returns.
The ￿rm o⁄ers a full-refund contract only if the no-arbitrage constraint, r + t ￿ p;
binds in (Pu): As this is impossible when t < c;8 in this case a partial refund is optimal.
(This bound is not tight ￿partial refunds are optimal if t ￿ c is positive but not too
large.)
8By Theorem 2 and (10), p
￿ = P(r
￿;c) ￿ r
￿ + c: Hence, p
￿ > r
￿ + t when c > t:
16Turning to comparative statics, recall that in the present case the optimal contract
solves (Pu); and that (IAu) binds. So P(r;c) can be substituted for p to eliminate a
constraint and variable. We can also dispense with the nonbinding constraint r ￿ ￿t:
Hence, (p￿;r￿) is optimal if and only if p￿ = P(r￿;c); and r￿ solves the following program:
(P
￿
u) maxr P(r;c) ￿ k ￿ (r ￿ s)F(r)
subject to (IR
￿
u) P(r;c) ￿ Vu(r);
(FE
￿) r + t ￿ P(r;c):
When the constraints do not bind, the ￿rst-order condition (using Pr = F(r)=F(P)) is
1
F(p)




where p = P(r;c): We can view (13) as de￿ning p as a function of (r;s); say ^ p(r;s);
for s 2 [0;1] and r 2 [s;1]: If the constraints in (P￿
u) do not bind, an optimal contract
(p￿;r￿) satis￿es the two-equation system,
p￿ = ^ p(r￿;s) and p￿ = P(r￿;c): (14)








> 0 for r 2 (s;1):
This condition insures that (14) has a unique solution,10 as it implies that ^ p(r;s) de-
creases in r: Hence, since ^ p(s;s) = 1 > P(s;c) and ^ p(1;s) < 1 ￿ P(1;c); and P(r;c) is
increasing in r; the system (14) has a unique solution, (p￿;r￿) 2 (0;1)￿(s;1): Figure 2
illustrates.
When (FE￿) does not bind, Figure 2 reveals the comparative statics properties with
respect to the information cost. Given the c shown in the ￿gure, the optimal contract
is the point at which the curves ^ p(￿;s) and P(￿;c) cross, yielding the optimal refund
r￿ = r￿(c;s): It is to the left of the point rvp = rvp(c) at which P(￿;c) and Vu cross,
and so satis￿es (IRu): In this unconstrained case we have @r￿=@c < 0 and @p￿=@c > 0;
since the curve P(￿;c) increases in c: However, as c increases the cro ssing point rvp
decreases. Once c has risen to c0; we have r￿ = rvp; i.e., the constraint (IRu) just binds.
9Condition (R) strengthens Assumption 2. It holds if d[rf(r)=F(r)] > 0 on (0;1); and is satis￿ed,
e.g., by F(r) = r
￿ for any ￿ > 0:
10Without (R), (14) may have multiple solutions, and only some would be optimal. But the set of
optimal solutions would still exhbit the monotonicities that we show below, as can be veri￿ed by the















Figure 2: Comparative statics with t < c < c0 < ￿ c:
It continues to bind at all c 2 (c0;￿ c); and on this interval @r￿=@c < 0 and @p￿=@c < 0:
In the limit, (p￿;r￿) ! (Vu(s);s) as c ! ￿ c: The heavy curve is the path of the optimal
contract as the information cost increases from c to ￿ c:
Similarly, when (FE￿) does not bind, Figure 2 reveals the comparative statics with
respect to the salvage value. As s increases, the curve ^ p(￿;s) shifts up. Hence, at the
indicated c and s in which (IRu) does not bind, @r￿=@s and @p￿=@s are both positive.
Once s has risen to point where r￿ = rvp; further increases yield @r￿=@s = @p￿=@s = 0:
Finally, we can now see what happens if (FE￿) binds. Envision the line p = r + t
in Figure 2. It is steeper at any r than are the curves P(￿;c) and Vu (see Lemma
4 in Appendix A). This line passes through the indicated (p￿;r￿) when t = p￿ ￿ r￿:
Then (FE￿) binds, and the optimal contract is a full-refund contract. As t increases the
optimal contract remains a full-refund contract, sliding leftward down the P(￿;c) curve.
Thus, in this region, the optimal price p￿; and so the gross refund ^ r￿ = p￿; as well as
the net refund r￿; all decrease in t: Shifting curves in the ￿gure also reveals that when
(FE￿) binds, @r￿=@c > 0 and @p￿=@c > 0; 11 and @r￿=@s = @p￿=@s = 0:
The following table summarizes the predicted changes in the optimal contract for
each increase in a parameter, given c 2 (c;￿ c):
11Note that (FE
￿) does not bind when c is close to ￿ c; since then r
￿ is close to s; and we have




c s t c s t c s t
r￿ ￿ + 0 ￿ 0 0 + 0 ￿
^ r￿ ￿ + + ￿ 0 + + 0 ￿
p￿ + + 0 ￿ 0 0 + 0 ￿
We make two comments about these comparative statics predictions. First, without
the underlying model of information acquisition deterrence, it would be surprising to
see the price and refund move in opposite directions, as is predicted in Table 1 in the
unconstrained case when c changes. One would have instead expected the refund and
price to be co-monotone, reasoning that when a smaller refund is promised, demand
decreases and so a lower price should be charged. Here, however, the information
acquisition constraint prevents the ￿rm from charging as high a price and promising as
low a refund as it would otherwise do. An increase in c loosens this constraint, allowing
the ￿rm to move both variables as desired, the price up and the refund down.
Second, the predictions when (FE￿
u) bind have special import because they apply to
the many markets in which full refunds are prevalent. And they too are somewhat sur-
prising. For example, consider the result that the refund increases in c. One might have
expected that when consumers ￿nd it more costly to become informed, the ￿rm should
lower the refund because it can now do so without triggering information acquisition.
Here, however, a contract is optimal only because the information acquisition constraint
prevents the price from being raised, and the no-arbitrage constraint prevents the re-
fund from being raised. An increase in c weakens the information acquisition constraint,
thereby allowing the ￿rm to raise the price without triggering information acquisition,
and the higher price weakens the no-arbitrage constraint, thereby allowing the refund
to be raised as well. A similar explanation applies to the result that when (FE￿
u) binds,
the gross refund, ^ r￿ = r￿ + t; decreases in t:
Remark. The result that full refunds are optimal for a range of parameters ￿those
for which (FE￿
u) binds ￿depends on the form of the no-arbitrage constraint we have
assumed, ^ r ￿ p: In some cases this constraint may take other forms. Suppose, for
example, that a consumer must pay t whenever she returns the product, even if she
has not tried it.12 The no-arbitrage constraint should then be ^ r ￿ t ￿ p; and so (FE￿
u)
12As a referee has observed, this may occur if the ￿rm is somehow able to costlessly prevent consumers
from immediately returning the product after purchasing.
19becomes r ￿ P(r;c): This weaker constraint never binds in (P￿
u) (by the logic of footnote
8, with t = 0): Hence, full refunds are now optimal only in knife-edge cases, and an
optimal refund can be more than full, ^ r￿ > p￿: The optimal contract now always satis￿es
the comparative statics results obtained above for when (FE￿
u) is nonbinding.
6.3. Low Information Costs
When c 2 [0;c); the ￿rm induces consumers to become informed. No refunds are paid,
no goods are returned, and too few goods are sold because p￿ > k (else pro￿t would not
be positive).
The comparative statics in this case are simple. The optimal price depends only on
c and k: It is either the unconstrained monopoly price pI for informed consumers, which
is constant in c and increasing in k; or it is Pi(c); which is constant in k and decreases in
c: The price is never greater than pI; since it is equal to Pi(c) if and only if this amount
is less than pI: When Pi(c) is the optimal price, a lowering of their cost of becoming
informed does not bene￿t the consumers, since the ￿rm just raises the price enough to
keep them indi⁄erent about purchasing.
6.4. Comparative Statics of c and ￿ c
We now determine how the interval of medium information costs, (c;￿ c); varies with
the parameters. This allows one to determine how an economy-wide change a⁄ects
the number of product markets in which consumers are induced to stay uninformed by
excessive refunds.
The upper endpoint ￿ c of this interval is explicitly de￿ned by (11): It depends only
on F and s; and it decreases in s:13
The lower endpoint c is more interesting. Note that program (Pu) depends on
(k;s;t); and (Pi) depends on k: So in general c depends on all these parameters, since
it is determined by the equation
￿u(c;k;s;t) = ￿i(c;k): (15)
At c; both functions are continuous, ￿u is strictly increasing in c; and ￿i is nonincreasing
in c (see Lemma 2 and its proof). Thus, any change in (s;t) that raises (lowers) ￿u will
lower (raise) c:
We therefore see that c = c(k;s;t) decreases in s; since ￿u increases in s: We also see
that c does not locally depend on t when (FE￿) does not bind in (P￿
u) in a neighborhood
13>From (11) we obtain ￿ c
0(s) = F(Vu(s))V
0
u(s) ￿ F (s) = ￿[1 ￿ F(Vu(s))]F (s) < 0.
20of c; i.e., when at c the optimal refund that induces consumers to stay uninformed is a
partial one. If it is instead a full refund, then raising t tightens the binding constraint
(FE￿); and so lowers ￿u and increases c:
To derive the sign of @c=@k; note ￿rst that @￿u=@k = ￿1; since the objective function
of (Pu) is p￿k ￿(r ￿s)F(r); and the constraints do not depend on k: The constraints
of (Pi) also do not depend on k; and it￿ s objective function is (p ￿ k)(1 ￿ F(p)): The







which is positive because @￿u=@c > 0 and @￿i=@c ￿ 0:14
The following table summarizes how c and ￿ c change when the parameters increase.
k s t
￿ c 0 ￿ 0
c + ￿ 0;+
Observe that the interval of information costs (c;1) for which refunds are o⁄ered ex-
pands if k decreases, or if t decreases and optimal refunds at c are full refunds, or if
s increases. Thus, if economy-wide e¢ ciency gains lower production costs, lower the
transaction costs of returning products, or lower the cost of processing returns for sal-
vage, refunds should be o⁄ered for more products.
6.5. Ine¢ cient Information Acquisition
Recall that the e¢ cient information acquisition decision depends on whether c exceeds
c￿: Thus, when c < c < c￿; the ￿rm induces consumers to stay uninformed, but they
would become informed in the e¢ cient outcome. The optimal refund is not only too
large given that the consumers have stayed uninformed (r￿ > s); but it is also too large
relative to the zero refund that would be ￿rst-best e¢ cient.
The opposite is true when c￿ < c < c: The ￿rm then induces consumers to become
informed, but they would stay uninformed in the e¢ cient outcome. It is more pro￿table
in this case to induce information acquisition, because the recovery of the cost of pro-
ducing the good for low-valued consumers outweighs the loss of giving the purchasing
14A slightly more involved argument is required if ￿u or ￿i is not di⁄erentiable at c; but it amounts
to the same thing, given the monotonicities and continuities of ￿u and ￿i:
21informed consumers an information rent. Observe that in this case, the ￿rm o⁄ers a
refund that is too small (zero) relative to the e¢ cient refund, r = s:
Both types of ine¢ ciency can occur. Examples are given in Appendix B which show
that c￿ can lie to either side of c:
7. Extensions
We sketch here two extensions of the model. The ￿rst is to allow consumers to receive
a bene￿t from the good in the trial period ￿the case of prom dresses the day before the
senior prom, or television sets the day before the Super Bowl. The second is to settings
with competing ￿rms.
7.1. Trial Period Bene￿ts
We incorporate trial period bene￿ts by simply assuming each consumer receives an
expected bene￿t of b > 0 from using the good during the trial period. While it may be
random ex ante, this bene￿t is uncorrelated with the consumer￿ s value v that she will
obtain in the post-trial period if she keeps the good. A more general pre and post-trial
period bene￿t structure is beyond our scope here.15
The expected bene￿t b appears in the model as a constant added to a consumer￿ s
payo⁄ when she purchases. It does not a⁄ect her return decision, which remains based
on a comparison of the refund r to the post-trail period value v. Consequently, the
inclusion of these trial period bene￿ts does not alter the level of optimal refunds. It
does, however, expand the set of situations in which a refund is o⁄ered. We sketch here
the arguments for these results.
Consider program (Pu): An uninformed consumer o⁄ered a contract (p;r) will pur-
chase only if p ￿ Vu(r) + b; so that this is the new (IRu) constraint. Her payo⁄ if she
were to become informed is Vi(p ￿ b) ￿ c; since an informed consumer now purchases
when v ￿ p ￿ b: It is easy to show that she prefers staying uninformed if and only if
p ￿ P(r;c)+b; and so this is the new (IAu) constraint. Since one of these two constraints
must bind, the only change to the solution of (Pu) is that the optimal price increases by
b. The optimal refund is unchanged, as is the upper bound ￿ c on the interval of medium
information costs. The new pro￿t function ￿u shifts up by b:
Turning to program (Pi); its objective function is now (p ￿ k)(1 ￿ F(p ￿ b)): Its
15Another special case is studied in Chu et.al.(1998), that in which trial period bene￿ts are perfectly
and negatively correlated with post-trial bene￿ts.
22constraints (IRi) and (IAi) are now p ￿ Pi(c) + b and p ￿ P(0;c) + b; respectively. If
neither binds, the new optimal price is larger than before, but the increase in pro￿t ￿u
is is less than b:16 Even if one of the constraints binds, so that the inclusion of b does
cause the optimal price to increase by b; ￿u still increases by less than b because not all
consumers purchase.
We thus see that the increasing function ￿u(c) increases by b; and the nondecreasing
function ￿i(c) increases by less than b: Hence, the point c at which the two are equal
decreases in b: The addition of trial period bene￿ts therefore expands both the interval
of information costs (c;1) at which a refund is o⁄ered, and the interval (c;￿ c) at which
an excessive refund is o⁄ered. The magnitude of the refunds that were o⁄ered in the
absence of the trial period bene￿ts are una⁄ected.
7.2. Competition
We have assumed the ￿rm is a monopoly, which may be inappropriate for situations in
which close substitutes for the ￿rm￿ s product are produced by other ￿rms. However, as
is commonly true of monopoly results, we view ours as suggestive of those that should
obtain in more complicated models of monopolistic competition. This makes sense even
if we interpret the ￿rm in the model as a consumer retailer, since the size and dominance
of retailers like K-Mart or Circuit City certainly indicate that they have market power.
The argument of Diamond (1961) seems particularly compelling for retailing; when
it applies, a seller has monopoly power because consumers do not know the price and
refund it o⁄ers until they arrive at the store, and their cost of conducting another search
at a competing seller is positive.
Another way of introducing retail competition is to assume the ￿rm is a wholesaler,
selling the good to competing retailers that then sell it to the consumers. The ￿rm
uses a variant of consignment selling: it sells the good to the retailers together with the
promise to pay a refund for the goods that the consumers return to them. The retailers
then compete in a Bertrand fashion, each one publicly o⁄ering a refund contract to
attract consumers. As noted in Section 3, this kind of competition yields the retailers
zero pro￿ts, and the retail outcome is e¢ cient. However, the procurement cost of the
retailers is the price they are charged by the wholesaler for product, and their salvage
value for a consumer return is the refund the wholesaler subsequently pays when the
good is returned to it. The equilibrium retail price is thus equal to the price the
16Letting pI(b) be the unconstrained maximizer, when the constraints do not bind the envelope
theorem yields @￿i=@b = (pI(b)￿k)f(pI(b)￿b); which by the ￿rst-order condition is 1￿F(pI(b)￿b) < 1:
23wholesaler charges the retailers, and the equilibrium refund is equal to the refund the
wholesaler pays to retailers. The wholesaler consequently acts as though it were selling
directly to consumers, and the results of the model apply immediately. (The details of
this argument are in Matthews and Persico, 2005).
8. Concluding Remarks
To summarize quickly, we have presented a model in which, if the cost to consumers
of learning ex ante their personal ￿t to a product lies in an intermediate range, the
seller will induce them to remain uninformed by o⁄ering a guarantee of satisfaction that
speci￿es an excessive refund. The refund is then larger than the seller￿ s salvage value
for a return, and it therefore generates an ine¢ ciently large number of returns.
The extent to which refunds and returns are excessive awaits careful empirical study.
In our view, it is very plausible that they are excessive for many products. Refunds
are often patently generous,17 and retailers view returns as costly.18 Logically, those
commonly-seen refunds that o⁄er full money back must exceed the seller￿ s salvage value
for a return: positive pro￿t implies that a product￿ s purchase price should exceed its
procurement cost, and the latter should exceed the salvage value because the seller
should be unwilling to pay more for a return than the cost of procuring a new unit. For
the model of this paper to have force, excessive refunds should be found for products
about which consumers could learn their values by exerting ex ante e⁄ort, but they
choose instead to stay largely uninformed.
We do not claim, however, that the suppression of information acquisition is the
only rationale for excessive refunds. Refunds may be excessive for di⁄erent reasons
in di⁄erent settings. For example, if there are two types of consumer, one that is
exogenously informed and one that is exogenously uninformed, the seller may want to
o⁄er a large refund to the uninformed in order to charge them a price large enough to
17In a survey of 133 Sacramento area retail stores, Davis et al.(1998) found that sixty percent of the
department chain stores, and nineteen percent of the single outlet specialty stores, o⁄ered full money
back with no restrictions. In the data that Chu et al.(1998) present for computer mail-order stores,
forty percent of the stores o⁄ered full money back (not including shipping), while the rest deducted
10-20% of the purchase price as a restocking fee.
18￿Returns have been regarded by online retailers as an unwanted headache, and all too frequently, an
expensive one. Gartner Inc.￿ s Gartner G2 Retail Services Group estimates that returns are costing re-
tailers anywhere from 0.2% to as much as 25% of sales. Forrester Research has estimated that next year,
retailers will spend $9 billion to process some $11.5 billion in returned goods purchased online.￿(￿Dealing
with Returns,￿Internet Retailer, August 2002, http://www.internetretailer.com/article.asp?id=7419.)
24deter the informed consumers from selecting their contract.19 Alternatively, if consumers
are risk averse as in Che (1996), an insurance rationale can be shown to cause e¢ cient
refunds to exceed salvage values. (But are consumers really so risk averse in many
product markets?) Agency provides another reason: a liberal return policy may deter
salespeople from using high-pressure sales tactics, since misleading a customer into
purchasing is then likely to generate a return rather than an increase in monthly sales.20
Behavioral economics provides yet another reason: sellers might o⁄er large refunds in
order to induce purchases, at little cost because the endowment e⁄ect causes consumers
to rarely return a good once purchased.21 (But then, what accounts for the large
numbers of returns?) Lastly, when product quality rather than personal ￿t is the issue,
the warranties literature gives rationales for excessive warranties ranging from screening
heterogeneous consumers to signaling a seller￿ s private information (see Subsection 1.1).
For each rationale there is probably a setting in which it has merit.
In our view the most interesting and robust result of the model is that sometimes
￿rms want to induce consumers to stay uninformed, and they do so by promising large
refunds. We do not, however, wish to emphasize the ancillary result that a ￿rm o⁄ers a
no-refund contract generating no returns when it wants to induce consumers to become
informed. This no-refund no-return result obtains in the model because its informed
consumers do not return the good when they purchase it. But if a consumer could
only become imperfectly informed ex ante, and then learn more during the trial period,
she might sometimes return the good if promised a refund. The seller might then o⁄er
a refund that generates returns, even when it induces information acquisition. These
refunds, we conjecture, would be small and generate too few returns. We leave this
generalization to future work.
19This screening idea is explored in Model SC of the working paper, Matthews and Persico (2005).
20We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
21The endowment e⁄ect is studied, e.g., by Kahneman et al.(1990), and by Plott and Zeiler (2005).
25Appendix A. Analysis of Program (Pu)
Results concerning program (Pu) are derived here, and Proposition 1 (ii) proved.
De￿ne pm(r;c) ￿ min(Vu(r);P(r;c)): Since (IRu) or (IAu) must bind in (Pu), we see
that (p￿;r￿) solves it if and only if p￿ = pm(r￿;c) and r￿ solves
(P
m
u ) ￿u(c) ￿ max
r pm(r;c) ￿ k ￿ (r ￿ s)F(r)
subject to 0 ￿ r + t ￿ pm(r;c):
The constraint set of this program contains ￿t; and so is nonempty. Since pm(r;c) =
min(r;r+c) = r for r ￿ 1; every such r yields the same pro￿t, r￿k￿(r￿s)(1) = s￿k:
Thus, since all its functions are continuous, standard arguments show that (Pm
u ) has a
solution for each c ￿ 0, and ￿u is continuous.
Figure 3 may be helpful. It is drawn for c < ￿ c; so that P(s;c) < Vu(s); and with a
fairly small t so that the crossing points satisfy rvp < rv < rp: (At larger t; rp = rv = rvp













Figure 3: The constraint set of program (Pu):
Lemma 4. Suppose c < ￿ c and ^ r ￿ ￿t: Then rvp; rv; and rp exist such that
(i) s < rvp ￿ 1; and Vu(^ r) ￿ P(^ r;c) if and only if ^ r ￿ rvp;
(ii) s < rv ￿ 1; and Vu(^ r) ￿ ^ r + t if and only if ^ r ￿ rv;
(iii) ￿t ￿ rp ￿ 1; and P(^ r;c) ￿ ^ r + t if and only if ^ r ￿ rp:
26Proof. The facts that each pair of functions of r can cross only once, and in the ways
indicated, follows from a comparison of their slopes: since V 0
u(r) = F(r); Pr(r;c) =
F(r)=F(P(r;c)); and (r + t)0 = 1; and since P(r;c) ￿ r; we have
V 0
u(r) ￿ Pr(r;c) ￿ (r + t)0:
The desired crossing points are
rvp ￿ supfr ￿ ￿t : Vu(r) ￿ P(r;c)g;
rv ￿ supfr ￿ ￿t : Vu(r) ￿ r + tg; and
rp ￿ supfr ￿ ￿t : P(r;c) ￿ r + tg:
We know rvp is well-de￿ned and greater than s because c < ￿ c implies Vu(s) = P(s;￿ c) >
P(s;c); rv is well-de￿ned and greater than s because Assumptions 1 and 3 imply Vu(s) >
k ￿ s + t; rp is well-de￿ned because P(￿t;c) = P(0;c) ￿ 0: ￿
The constraint pm(r;c) ￿ r +t is equivalent to the conjunction of Vu(r) ￿ r +t and
P(r;c) ￿ r + t: Hence, by Lemma 4, (Pm
u ) can be rewritten as
(P
m
u ) ￿u(c) ￿ max
r
pm(r;c) ￿ k ￿ (r ￿ s)F(r)
subject to ￿t ￿ r ￿ min(rv;rp):
Proof of Proposition 1 (ii). Let c < ￿ c; and suppose ￿u(c) > 0: Let r￿ be a solution
of (Pm
u ); and set p￿ = pm(r￿;c): We must prove p￿ = P(r￿;c) and r￿ > s:
Proof that p￿ = P(r￿;c): The de￿nition of pm implies p￿ ￿ P(r￿;c): Assume this
inequality is strict. Then pm(r￿;c) = Vu(r￿) < P(r￿;c); and Lemma 4 (i) implies
s < rvp < r￿: By continuity, ^ r 2 (s;r￿) exists such that pm(r;c) = Vu(r) for all r 2 [^ r;r￿]:




[Vu(r) ￿ (r ￿ s)F(r)] = (s ￿ r)f(r) < 0:
So ^ r yields greater pro￿t than does r￿: And ^ r is feasible for (Pm
u ); since ￿t ￿ s < ^ r and
^ r < r￿ ￿ min(rv;rp): This contradiction of the optimality of r￿ proves p￿ = P(r￿;c): ￿
Proof that r￿ > s: Since pm(r￿;c) = P(r￿;c); we have Vu(r￿) ￿ P(r￿;c): This and
Lemma 4 imply r￿ ￿ rvp: Hence, letting ^ r = min(rv;rp;rvp); r￿ solves the program
max
￿t￿r￿^ r
P(r;c) ￿ k ￿ (r ￿ s)F(r); (16)
27and the value of this program is ￿u(c): Let A(r) denote its objective function, and note







F(r) + (s ￿ r)f(r): (17)
The ￿rst term in (17) is positive for r 2 (0;s]; since r ￿ s and c < ￿ c imply that
P(r;c) < P(s;￿ c) = Vu(s) < 1: The second term in (17) is nonnegative for r 2 (0;s]:
Hence, A0(r) > 0 on (0;s]: Since s > 0; the interval (0;s] contains s; and so A0(s) > 0:
We conclude that ￿ r > s exists such that A(r2) > A(r1) for any r2 2 (0; ￿ r] and r1 < r2:
Now assume r￿ ￿ s: Then, by the argument just given, any r > s must be infeasible
for (16), so that ^ r ￿ s: Furthermore, ^ r itself must solve (16). Because we know s <
min(rv;rvp) from Lemma 4; the fact that ^ r ￿ s implies ^ r = rp: Lemma 4 (iii) and the
continuity of P(￿;c) yield P(rp;c) = rp + t: Thus,
￿u(c) = P(rp;c) ￿ k + (s ￿ rp)F(rp)
= rp + t ￿ k + (s ￿ rp)F(rp)
￿ rp + t ￿ k + (s ￿ rp)
= s + t ￿ k:
Assumption 1 now implies the contradiction ￿u(c) ￿ 0: This proves r￿ > s: ￿
Appendix B. The Uniform Model
In this appendix we illustrate the model under the assumption that F is the uniform
distribution. Along the way we show that both c￿ < c and c < c￿ are possible, and that
sometimes it is optimal for the ￿rm to o⁄er a full-refund contract.













2(k2 ￿ s2) ￿ c = 1
8(1 ￿ s2)2:




2c: Recalling that (FE￿)
does not bind in (P￿
u) when t < c; we see that
t < c ) ￿u(c) = max
r￿rvp P(r;c) ￿ k ￿ (r ￿ s)F(r): (18)
28Case s = 0 and t < c:
(In the text we assumed s > 0: But this was only for simplicity, as it allowed the
avoidance of possible corner cases that do not arise when F is uniform. The follow-
ing expressions are valid for s = 0; and they are also the limits of the corresponding
expressions for s > 0 as s ! 0:)
Given s = 0; we have ￿ c = 1=8: For c < 1=8: the solution of (18) when its constraint
is dropped is r￿ =
p
:25 ￿ 2c: This is the actual solution in this case (so (IR￿
u) does not
bind), since it is less than rvp when c < 1=8: The optimal price is thus p￿ = P(r￿;c) = :5;







We now derive ￿i(c￿): Since s = 0 and Vu(0) = 1=2; Assumptions 1 and 3 imply that
the set of possible values for k is [t;1=2): For such k; easy algebra shows that pI < Pi(c￿)
if and only if k < 1=3: Hence,
￿i(c￿) = ￿i(min(pI;Pi(c￿))) =
(
1
4 (1 ￿ k)
2 for k ￿ 1=3
k(1 ￿ 2k) for k > 1=3:
We conclude, again on the basis of suppressed algebra, that ￿i(c￿) > ￿u(c￿) for all
k 2 (0;1=2): Therefore, c￿ < c when s = 0 and t < c:
Case (k;s) = (:375; :125) and t < c:
We show numerically that c￿ > c holds in this case. The ￿rst computation is c￿ = :063:
To obtain ￿i(c￿); we compute Pi(c￿) = 1 ￿
p
2c￿ = :646 and pI = :688: Thus,
Pi(c￿) < pI: So Proposition 2 implies ￿i(c￿) = ￿i(Pi(c￿)); which yields ￿i(c￿) = :096:
To obtain ￿u(c￿); we ￿rst note that when c = c￿; rvp = :541: This is su¢ ciently high
that it does not bind in (18), since numerically solving its ￿rst-order condition yields
r￿ = :392: So this r￿ is the solution, and we have ￿u(c￿) = :115:
Because ￿u(c￿) > ￿i(c￿); we conclude that c < c￿:
Case (c;k;s) = (:1;:375; :125) and t 2 [:228;:25]:
We show numerically that the ￿rm￿ s optimal policy in this case is to induce consumers
to stay uninformed, and it does so by o⁄ering a full refund. Note that Assumptions
1 ￿ 3 hold for these parameter restrictions.
29In this case, constraint (IR￿
u) holds in (P￿
u) if and only if r ￿ rvp = :325: The other














r2 + :2 ￿ :375 ￿ (r ￿ :125)r: (19)
The objective function of this program is strictly increasing on [0;:392]: Thus, since

















We now compare this to ￿i(c): Since
pI = argmax
p (p ￿ k)(1 ￿ p) =
1
2
(k + 1) = :688;
and this exceeds ￿ v = :5; Proposition 2 implies ￿i(c) = ￿i(min(pI;Pi(c)): Here we have
Pi(:1) = :553 < pI: Hence,
￿i(:1) = ￿i(:553) = :080:
A computation now shows that ￿u(c) > ￿i(c) for t 2 [:228;:25]: We conclude that for
each t in this interval, the optimal contract is the full refund contract (P(rp;c);rp):
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